In this paper we study the complexity of deontic logics grounded on norm-based semantics and apply norm-based deontic logic to access control. Four principal norm-based deontic logics have been proposed so far: imperative logic, input/output logic, deontic default logic and deontic defeasible logic. We present the readers that imperative logic is complete for the 2ed level of the polynomial hierarchy and deontic default logic is located in the 3ed level of the polynomial hierarchy. We then show how it is possible to impose restrictions to imperative logic such that the complexity goes down to be tractable, allowing the logic to be used in practical applications. We focus on a specific application: access control.
Introduction
Deontic logic is a formal study of normative reasoning and norms. In 1951, the philosopher and logician Georg von Wright wrote a paper called ''Deontic Logic'' [1] , which subsequently became the name of the research area. Von Wright's deontic logic is exactly the same as the modal logic KD. Such logic is later called standard deontic logic (SDL) . With the work of Meyer [2] , deontic logic became a part of computer science. SDL has been a useful tool in the specification and reasoning of access control policies because key notions in access control such as permission, prohibition and obligation are exactly the subjects of SDL [3] [4] [5] .
Deontic logic provides a mathematically rigorous language for modeling access control policies. The vagueness and ambiguity of informal language disappear in the formal language of deontic logic. Deontic logic is also associated with a sound and complete axiomatic characterization. The interpretation of the normative concepts is axiomatically constructed in deontic logic. As a consequence of completeness, the framework is guaranteed to be consistent. Without consistency, the move to the implementation level would be meaningless.
Different approaches of deontic logic, alternative to SDL, have been studied in the past 6 decades including imperative logic [6, 7] , dynamic deontic logic [2, 8] , deontic STIT logic [9, 10] , input/output logic [11] , deontic default logic [12, 13] and deontic defeasible logic [14, 15] . Those results are summarized in the handbook of deontic logic [16, 17] . In imperative logic, input/output logic, deontic default logic and deontic defeasible logic, norms are explicitly represented. The truth value of deontic propositions in those logics are explained not by some set of possible worlds, but with references to a set of given norms. Such a non-possible world semantics has been originally termed in Hansen [18] as 'norm-based semantics'. We then use norm-based deontic logic as a general term to refer input/output logic, imperative logic, deontic default logic and deontic defeasible logic and use deontic modal logic to refer those approaches which adopt possible world semantics such as SDL.
Norms are the first class citizens in norm-based deontic logic. Norms are everywhere in our daily life and also in access control. For example:
• You should drive on the right side.
• Alice is permitted to read file-1 on Mondays.
• Bob is forbidden to write on file-2.
• Carol is obliged to delete all related files when he finishes his task.
In general, we view norms as normative rules which are used to regulated agent's behavior. A norm is a rule in the sense that it contains both a premise and a consequence. The premise describes the situation in which it is triggered, while the consequence prescribes the demand of the norm. Norms are normative in the sense http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2017.01.028 0167-739X/© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Norm-based deontic logic solves the contrary-to-duty paradox.
The contrary-to-duty paradox is the most notorious paradox in deontic logic. The original phrasing of the paradox requires a formalization of the following scenario in which the sentences are mutually consistent and logically independent [19] .
(a) It ought to be that John goes to help his neighbors.
(b) It ought to be that if John goes to help his neighbors, then he tells them he is coming. (c) If John does not go to help his neighbors, then he ought not to tell them he is coming. (d) John does not go to help. But the formalization of the above scenario using SDL is either inconsistent or not logically independent. Being not able to solve the contrary-to-duty paradox is seen as one of the most serious limitations of SDL. The contrary-to-duty scenario is also found in access control and it is called the ''violation of obligation'' in Benferhat et al. [20] and corresponds to the policy of reaction to new intrusions in Cuppens [5] .
Norm-based deontic logic, on the other hand, gives consistent and logically independent formalization of the above scenario, therefore solves the contrary-to-duty paradox. In general, norm-based deontic logic provides correct prescriptions in situations where some norms are already violated [21] . 2. Norm-based deontic logic offers a formal mechanism to deal with normative conflicts. Consider the following scenario taken from Hansen [7] , which is sometimes called the 'order puzzle': before you go to a party, you become the recipient of various imperative sentences: (a) Your mother says: if you drink anything, then do not drive. (b) Your best friend says: if you go to the party, then you drive. (c) Some acquaintance says: if you go to the party, then have a drink with me. Assume mother is more important than best friend, who is more important than acquaintance. What will you do? Intuitively, you should obey your mother and your best friend, and hence do the driving and not accept your acquaintance's invitation. However, it is not so clear what formal mechanism could explain this reasoning. Handling normative conflicts is also an important issue in access control and is discussed in Benferhat et al. [20] . SDL is unable to handle such conflicting imperatives. On the other hand, norm-based deontic logic appears as suitable tools to formalize such reasoning. 3. Norm-based deontic logic characterizes various notions of permission. Permission is probably the most important notion in the specification of an access control policy [22, 23] . Philosophically, it is common to distinguish between two kinds of permission: negative permission and positive permission. Negative permission is straightforward to describe: something is negatively permitted according to certain norms iff it is not prohibited by those norms. That is, iff there is no obligation to the contrary. Positive permission is more elusive. Intuitively, something is positively permitted according to certain norms iff it can be derived from those norms. But what exactly does ''derive'' mean? In mathematics we can derive theorems in a ''straight'' way or by contradiction. These two methods of derivation give two different notions of positive permission. Makinson and van der Torre [24] introduces these two types of positive permission as static and dynamic permission. Other notions of permission, such as permission as exception, have been studied in [25, 26] . All these notions of permission are useful in access control and can be captured by norm-based deontic logics, while SDL is only able to capture negative permission.
The above advantages of norm-based deontic logic shows that comparing to SDL, norm-based deontic logic is a better tool to be applied in the specification and reasoning of access control policies. Among those existing norm-based deontic logics, imperative logic is the most suitable for access control because different notions of permission can be uniformly expressed in imperative logic.
For the existing norm-based deontic logics, the computational complexity of input/output logic and deontic defeasible logic is studied in [27, 26] . In this paper, we study the complexity of imperative logic and deontic default logic (Sections 3 and 5.1). We show that both imperative logic and deontic default logic are decidable but computationally intractable. We then impose restrictions to obtain some tractable imperative logic such that we can practically apply them to access control (Section 4). For the sake of readability, we put all proofs in the Appendix.
Background: complexity theory
We assume the readers are familiar with notions like Turing machines and the complexity classes P, NP and coNP. Oracle Turing machines and some complexity classes related to oracle Turing machines will be used in this paper. [28] ). An oracle for a language L is a device that is capable of reporting whether any string w is a member of L. An oracle Turing machine M L is a modified Turing machine that has the additional capability of querying an oracle. Whenever M L writes a string on a special oracle tape it is informed whether that string is a member of L, in a single computation step. 
Definition 1 (Oracle Turing Machine

Imperative logic
If some given norms come into conflict, the best an agent can be expected to do is to follow a maximal subset of those norms. Intuitively, a priority ordering over the norms can be helpful in resolving conflicts, but a formal resolution mechanism has been difficult to provide. In particular, reasoning about prioritized norms is overshadowed by problems such as the order puzzle that are not satisfactorily resolved by many existing approaches such as Brewka [29] , Marek and Truszczynski [30] . Based on input/output logic [11] , Hansen [7] develops prioritized imperative logic which overcomes those difficulties.
Input/output logic
Input/output logic takes its origin in the study of conditional norms. The basic idea is: norms are conceived as a deductive machine, like a black box which produces normative statements as output, when we feed it factual statements as input. In input/output logic, a norm is an ordered pair of formulas (a, x) ∈ L P × L P , where L P is the language of propositional logic build from the set of propositional atoms P. There are two types of norms which are used in input/output logic, mandatory norms and permissive norms. A mandatory norm (a, x) ∈ O is read as ''given a, x is obligatory''. A permissive norm (a, x) ∈ P is read as ''given a, x is permitted''. Mandatory norms are called commands or imperatives in imperative logic, while permissive norms are called licenses or authorizations. To distinguish these two types of norms in notation, we may represent commands as a ⇒ o x and licenses as a ⇒ p x. In this paper, we will however stick the notation
used in input/output logic because no confusion will arise in our presentation.
Makinson and van der Torre [11] define the semantics of input/output logic for commands as follows:
Here Cn is the classical consequence operator of propositional logic. 1 Intuitively, x ∈ out(O, A) means that given a set of commands O and facts A, x is obligatory.
The proof system of input/output logic is build on derivations of commands. We say that a command (a, x) is derivable from a set O iff (a, x) is in the least set that extends O ∪ {(⊤, ⊤)} and is closed under a number of derivation rules. Here ⊤ is an arbitrary tautology. The following are the derivation rules which are used by Makinson and van der Torre [11] to construct the proof systems of input/output logic:
• AND (conjunction of output): from (a, x) and (a, y) to (a, x ∧ y). deriv(O) is the smallest set that extends O ∪ {(⊤, ⊤)} and is closed under the rules of SI, WO and AND.
Example 2. Let
Indeed:
In Makinson and van der Torre [11] , the following soundness and completeness theorem is given:
. Given a set of commands O and formula a,
Prioritized imperative logic
Reasoning about obligation
Hansen introduces preferred obeyable maximal family (pomfamily) to characterize those commands which are still functioning in a given situation where not all commands can be obeyed. 
∈ O}, which transforms a command to a material implication. [7] , x 1 ) , . . . , (a n , x n ) such that (a i , x i ) (a i+1 , x i+1 ).
Definition 2 (Preferred Obeyable Maximal Family
Here note that every prioritization induces an element of the pomfamily. The result after resolving normative conflicts is characterized by the following output operator: A natural decision problem in the imperative logic framework is the obligation-checking problem: given a set of prioritized commands O
Example 3 (Order Puzzle Formalized
The following theorem reveals the complexity of the obligationchecking problem. 
Reasoning about permission
Permission is probably the most important notion in the specification of an access control policy. Several notions of permission are introduced in norm-based deontic logic [24] [25] [26] 18] . Hansen [18] gives a unified presentation of different notions of permission in the setting of imperative logic. However, the norms studied in Hansen [18] are unconditional norms. Combining the ideas from Makinson and van der Torre [24] and Hansen [18] , we define negative and positive permission in the setting of conditional norms. Definition 3. Given a normative system N = (O, P, >) where P is a finite set of licenses and >⊆ (O ∪ P) × (O ∪ P) is a priority relation over norms. Let A be a set of formulas representing factual statements.
NegPerm(N,
.
> is an ordered set with the set being O ∪ {(a ′ , x ′ )} and the ordering is obtained by restricting
Intuitively, x is negatively permitted iff x is not forbidden. Since something is forbidden iff its negation is obligatory, x is not forbidden iff ¬x is not obligatory. Licenses play no role in negative permission but they are treated like weak commands in positive permission. The only difference between licenses and commands in positive permission is that while the latter may be used jointly, the former may only be applied one by one. It is well acknowledged in the deontic logic literature that permission cannot be used jointly [24] . As an illustration of such difference, imaging a situation in which a man is permitted to date either one of two girls, but not both of them.
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If a license (a, x) has higher priority than a command (⊤, ¬x), positive permission can be understood as exception which says although x is forbidden in general, there is an exception which allows x, when a is the case. Detailed discussions of exception as a notion of permission can be found in Stolpe [25] and Governatori et al. [26] . On the other hand, if a license (⊤, x) has lower priority than a command (a, ¬x), positive permission can be understood as access denial which says although x is granted in general, such permission is canceled when a is the case. Taking licenses into consideration, natural decision problems in the imperative logic framework includes the following: given a normative system N = (O, P, >), a set of factual statements A and a target formula x,
• negative permission-checking: decide if x ∈ NegPerm(N, A).
• positive permission-checking: decide if x ∈ PosPerm(N, A).
The following theorem reveals the complexity of those permissionchecking problems. 
•
Reasoning about prohibition
Based on the two notions of permission, we now introduce two corresponding notions of prohibition: explicit prohibition and implicit prohibition. 
Intuitively, x is explicitly prohibited if ¬x is obligatory. On the other hand, x is implicitly prohibited if x is not positively permitted, which means there is no explicit command or license supporting x. • to decide if x ∈ ImProhi(N, A) is Σ p 2 -complete. Now we have a bundle of notions about permission and prohibition. Those notions are suitable for different applications. In the case of access control, we believe positive permission and its complement, implicit prohibition, are most useful. The reason is that the function of licenses are ignored in negative permission and explicit prohibition whereas in positive permission and implicit prohibition licenses play an important role. Moreover, the notion of access denial, which can hardly be modeled by most existing access control logics, can be modeled using positive permission and implicit prohibition. We illustrate this point by formalizing a scenario taken from van Hertum et al. [31] and show how imperative logic allows to correctly handle statements whose goal is to deny access rights.
Example 4.
Suppose Ann is a professor with control over a resource r, Bob is a Ph.D. student of Ann who needs access to r, and Charles is a postdoc of Ann supervising Bob. Ann wants to grant Bob access to r, but wants to grant Charles the right to deny Bob's access to r.
A natural way for Ann to do this is to issue the following access control policy: Let N = (O, P, >), where O = {(¬Bob_approve, ¬access(Charles, r))}, P = {(⊤, access(Charles, r))}, and the command has higher priority than the license. Now we have access(Charles, r) ∈ PosPerm(N, {⊤}) and access(Charles, r) ∈ ImProhi(N, {¬Bob_approve}), which means this access control policy has the effect that Charles has access to r unless Bob denies his access.
Another advantage of positive permission is that it also captures the idea of permission as exception, which is supported by Stolpe [25] . According to Stolpe, permission must ''denote the elimination of a norm from a normative system''. According to the definition of positive permission, if a license has higher priority than commands, then it eliminates all those commands which are not consistent with it. Therefore characterize permission as exception.
Tractable imperative logic for access control
Results from the above section show that although imperative logic is decidable, the complexity is however intractable. In order to practically use imperative logic in access control, we have to lighten the complexity. This section shows that under reasonable restrictions on the priority ordering and the syntax of language, the complexity turns out to be tractable.
For the priority relation >, we restrict it to be a relation such that the restriction of > on O is a strict linear order.
Such restriction ensures that the commands are strictly stratified, although different license can still be incomparable or of the same priority.
Concerning the syntax, we impose the following restrictions.
Let Lit P = P ∪ {¬p : p ∈ P} be the set of literals build from P.
Let L cnl P be the conjunctions of literals of P. A strict Horn clause is a non-empty disjunction of exactly one propositional atom and zero or more negated atoms. A Horn clause is a non-empty disjunction of at most one propositional atom and zero or more negated atoms. 
Related work and extension
Many cryptographic solutions to the problem of access control have been proposed [32] [33] [34] [35] . Multiple logics have been proposed for access control [36] [37] [38] . Most of these logics use a modality says k indexed by an agent k. says-based access control logics are designed for systems in which different agents can issue statements that become part of the access control policy. In contrast to the tractability of imperative logic, Garg and Abadi [39] show that the provability problem for says-based access control logic is PSPACE-complete.
Van Hertum et al. [31] have recently proposed a multi-agent variant of autoepistemic logic, called distributed autoepistemic logic with inductive definitions (dAEL(ID)), to be used as a saysbased access control logic. By applying the semantic principles of autoepistemic logic to characterize the says-modality, dAEL(ID) allows us to derive a statement of the form says ¬k φ on the basis of the observation that k has not issued statements implying φ.
Supporting reasoning about such negated says-statements allows dAEL(ID) to straightforwardly model access denials. A major difference between imperative logic and dAEL(ID) is that the former is able to handle the conflicts and priority between norms, which is not addressed in the latter.
Deontic default logic
Horty's deontic default logic [13] , which can be viewed as an attempt to reconstruct Reiter's default logic to normative 
The second notion is that of a default being conflicted in O ′ .
Let Conflicted (O,≥,A) (O ′ ) denote the set of all such defaults. The definition reads:
The third notion is that of a default being defeated in O ′ . For 
Combining Horty's framework with imperative logic, we define proper output with the idea of viewing proper scenario as something similar to pomfamily.
Another technical contribution in this paper is the following complexity result of deontic default logic. 
Conclusion
In this paper we study the complexity of deontic logics grounded on norm-based semantics and apply imperative logic to access control. We present the readers that prioritized imperative logic is complete for the 2ed level of the polynomial hierarchy. To apply imperative logic to access control, restrictions are imposed such that the complexity turns out to be tractable. We also show that deontic default logic is located in the 3ed level of the polynomial hierarchy.
A natural future work is to build imperative logic based on logics which have stronger expressive power than propositional logic (such as description logic) and use it to model access control policies. Implementing imperative logic by a logical programming language to build a deontic machine to perform automatic reasoning is another interesting future work. A third direction of future work is to generalize imperative logic for role-based access control. In role-based access control, permissions are associated with roles, and users are assigned to appropriate roles. From the perspective of deontic logic, roles are institutional facts which are created by constitutive norms. The logic of constitutive norms has been well studied [41] and the combination of constitutive and mandatory norms has been explored using input/output logic in Sun and van der Torre [42] . We estimate that by combining the logic of constitutive norms and imperative logic we can obtain a logical framework to model role-based access control and leave it for future work. 
